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ABSTRACT 
The Brokaw Act was proposed legislation aimed at “financial abuses being car-
ried out by activist hedge funds who promote short-term gains at the expense of 
long-term growth . . . .” Sponsoring Senators named it after a small town in Wis-
consin that, according to the Act’s sponsors, was decimated by the actions of a 
hedge fund activist in shutting down the local paper mill with a loss of hundreds 
of jobs. The Brokaw Act represented the first attempt at federal legislation aimed 
at restricting hedge fund activism. Since then, new and similar bipartisan pro-
posals have appeared as have threats of state regulation. In this Comment, we 
show that the occurrences in Brokaw, Wisconsin are far different from the repre-
sentations the sponsoring Senators made. Hedge fund activists played essentially 
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no role in the closure of the Brokaw mill. To the contrary, the paper company’s 
incumbent management closed the mill—just the latest in a series of manage-
ment’s mill closures—amid an industry-wide decline that made the mill uneco-
nomic to keep open. We then consider two claims of hedge fund activism’s oppo-
nents that appear to motivate the Brokaw Act. The first claim—that hedge fund 
activists typically use the ten-day disclosure period of Rule 13d-1 to accumulate 
positions significantly in excess of 5%—has been the subject of empirical study 
and is incorrect. The second claim—that hedge fund activists often form a “wolf 
pack” in the pre-disclosure period to act collectively against a target—is also 
without support from empirical evidence. Neither claim warrants legislative ac-
tion. Finally, we consider two additional parts of the Brokaw Act. The first would 
expand the concept of beneficial ownership to include certain derivatives linked 
to the value of equity securities, while the second would require increased disclo-
sure of short positions in the stock of public companies. Neither activity plays an 
important role in hedge fund activism, and both require additional study before 
the passage of any legislation. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most evidence to date supports the proposition that shareholders benefit from 
the actions of hedge fund activists.1 Nevertheless, hedge fund activism is unpop-
ular in many quarters, particularly among management and directors that become 
its targets, but also with some similarly-minded opponents in the academy and 
business. While hedge fund activism’s opponents acknowledge (as they must, 
given the evidence) that activism is on average associated with stock price in-
creases at target firms,2 they tend (notwithstanding evidence to the contrary)3 to 
characterize that average price increase as a short-run effect that merely reflects a 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1155 (2015) (concluding that the evidence establishes that hedge 
fund activism is “followed by long-term improvements, rather than declines, in performance”); Alon 
Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset 
Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN, STUD. 2723, 2769 (2015) (finding that hedge fund 
activism improves firm productivity); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Song Ma & Xuan Tian, How Does Hedge 
Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation? J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers .cfm?abstract_id=2409404 (finding that firms targeted by activist investors 
generate more patents that are of higher quality relative to a matched sample. Activists push firms to 
allocate internal innovation to key areas of expertise and inventors at target firms become more pro-
ductive relative to those at matched firms). 
2 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 551 (2016) (“All studies have found that 
activist campaigns result, on average, in short-term gains for shareholders . . . .”) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
3 See, e.g., Bebchuk, et al., supra note 1, at 1123 (finding that the short-run price increases that 
occur at the announcement of activist campaigns do not reverse over the long term). 
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higher probability of takeover or stock-popping restructuring events.4 In turn, they 
attribute little or no social or long-run value to hedge fund activism. 
In addition, some critics of hedge fund activism assert that activism results in 
decreased investment at target firms and, correspondingly, larger payouts to 
shareholders.5 While some have interpreted this as evidence that activism stops 
wasteful overinvestment,6 hedge fund activism’s opponents—implicitly assuming 
that most existing corporate investment is both in the interests of shareholders and 
socially valuable—point to reductions in corporate investment as evidence that 
hedge fund activism sacrifices long-term corporate and social gains for short-term 
shareholder returns.7  
Until recently, hedge fund activism’s opponents did nothing to target legisla-
tion against hedge fund activists, focusing mainly on public debate and requests 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission—largely ignored to date—for 
changes in rules that would hinder activist investments. In the words of a leading 
commentator,  
 
[u]nlike the hostile takeover, activism has precipitated no sig-
nificant changes in corporate law. Where the hostile takeover 
triggered structural changes in state corporate codes and the 
federal securities laws along with a root and branch reconfigu-
ration of fiduciary duty, hedge fund activism largely leaves cor-
porate law where it found it.8  
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 551. 
The positive abnormal stock returns on which proponents of hedge fund activism rely do not 
necessarily demonstrate true gains in efficiency, but may only indicate that the market has given the 
target firm a higher expected takeover premium; that difference is important because not only may 
this temporary increase later erode if no takeover results, but in any event it does not demonstrate a 
true efficiency gain. 
Id. 
The evidence is to the contrary, however. See, e.g., Nicole M. Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev & 
Anil Shivdasani, Activism Mergers, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm ?abstract_id=2677416 (finding that “even when a merger offer is unsuccessful, the offer is 
associated with an increase in the valuation of the target firm through the implementation of real fi-
nancial and investment policy changes rather than through revaluation effects.”). Id. 
5 See, e.g., Bebchuk, et al., supra note 1, at 1137 (identifying activism campaigns that resulted 
in decreased capital expenditures and research and development and campaigns that resulted in higher 
payouts to shareholders). 
6 See, e.g., id., at 1136 (“Thus, opponents of hedge fund activism overlook that reducing cash 
holdings and investments might actually move companies closer to, rather than away from, the levels 
that are optimal for the long term.”). Id. 
7 Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 552 (“[O]ur primary concern is . . . with the possibility that the 
increasing rate of hedge fund activism is beginning to compel corporate boards and managements to 
forego long-term investments (particularly in R&D) in favor of a short-term policy of maximizing 
shareholder payout in the form of dividends and stock buybacks.”) Id. 
8 William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudential Threat, in 
THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Aug. 22, 2016), 
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835610. 
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That almost changed last year. 
This Comment explores the first attempt at federal anti-activist legislation, 
examining both its motivations and its specific legislative goals. On March 17, 
2016, United States Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) 
introduced the legislation9 to “increase transparency and strengthen oversight of 
activist hedge funds.”10 Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Elizabeth Warren (D-
MA) co-sponsored the proposed legislation,11 which sought to implement four 
major changes to existing law. First, the legislation would have shortened the dis-
closure period of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act for over-5% own-
ership from ten days to two days.12 Second, the legislation would have expanded 
the concept of beneficial ownership to include certain derivatives linked to the 
value of equity securities.13 Third, the legislation would have given the Securities 
and Exchange Commission the right to determine when hedge funds are working 
together to avoid being characterized as a “group” that must disclose their collec-
tive interest in an activist target in the time required under Section 13(d).14 Fourth, 
the legislation would have required increased disclosure of short positions in the 
stock of public companies.15 
The legislation went nowhere, but in the late summer of 2017, Senator Bald-
win (D-WI) and Senator David Perdue (R-GA) re-introduced the Brokaw Act, 
bipartisan “legislation to increase transparency and strengthen oversight of pred-
atory activist hedge funds.”16 The re-introduced legislation would decrease the 
13(d) period from ten days to four days,17 up from the earlier proposal. It would 
“[p]rotect businesses from hedge fund ‘wolf packs’ by identifying these coordi-
nated groups of hedge funds as a single group to require disclosure,” essentially 
aiming at the same group disclosures as earlier,18 and it would, as earlier, 
“[r]equire derivative disclosure to prevent activist investors from profiting by se-
cretly voting against the company’s interests.”19 More recently, Senator Baldwin 
                                                 
9 Brokaw Act, S. 2720, 114th Cong. (2016). 
10 Press Release, U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin and Jeff Merkley Introduce Legislation to 
Strengthen Oversight of Activist Hedge Funds (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.baldwin.sen-
ate.gov/press-releases/brokaw-act (hereinafter “Press Release”); see also Donna Borak and David Be-
noit, Democrats Take Aim at Activist Investors, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/demo crats-take-aim-at-activist-investors-1458251491. 
11 Press Release, supra note 10. 
12 S. 2720, § 2(a). 
13 Id. at § 2(b). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at § 2(c). 
16 U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin and Jeff Merkley Introduce Legislation to Strengthen Oversight 
of Activists Hedge Funds, TAMMY BALDWIN (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-
releases/brokaw-act. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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put a hold on two nominees for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,20 
essentially pressuring the two to take positions on executive pay and share buy-
backs advocated by hedge fund activists.  
The Brokaw Act, and Senator Baldwin’s advocacy and intervention in the 
appointment of an SEC Commissioner, are stern warnings of policy divorced from 
evidence. The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate just how poorly sup-
ported the Brokaw Act was, given the claims of its supporters.  
II.  THE PROPOSED BROKAW ACT 
The Brokaw Act, according to its sponsors,  
 
is named for a small Wisconsin town that went bankrupt after 
an out-of-state hedge fund closed a paper mill that had provided 
good jobs to the town for over 100 years. The activist hedge 
fund bought up the legendary Wausau Paper Company, forced 
out its executives and demanded short-term returns like buy-
backs at the expense of the company’s long-term future . . . 
What happened in Wisconsin is one example of a larger prob-
lem that demands action.21  
 
The Senators used tough language in attacking hedge fund activists, promis-
ing that the Brokaw Act would “help ensure that no other small towns in America 
will fall victim to activist hedge funds on Wall Street.22 
In this section, we first explore what happened in Brokaw, Wisconsin, the 
offered inspiration for the proposed anti-activist legislation. Contrary to the claim 
that a hedge fund “forced out” executives and “closed a paper mill,” we uncover 
that it was Wausau’s incumbent management that closed the mill. The mill closure 
occurred during a wide downtrend in the domestic paper industry, and, consistent 
with those wider industry trends, Wausau Paper Corp. had shuttered other mills 
long before a hedge fund activist arrived on the scene. Recognizing the tremen-
dous misfortune of the lost jobs and the impact on the Brokaw community, it is 
inaccurate to lay that outcome at the feet of a hedge fund activist. Instead, to ad-
dress the root cause of these adverse events requires that one first acknowledge 
the broader trends in competition, regulation, the shift from printed media to elec-
tronic communication, and other factors that have led to the decline of this once 
successful industry and to the long-term implications for the communities that this 
industry once supported.  
                                                 
20 U.S. Senate OKs two U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission nominees, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 
2017, 12:22 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/22/reuters-america-u-s-senate-oks-two-u-s-securi-
ties-and-exchange-commission-nominees.html. 
21 Press Release, supra note 10. 
22 Id. 
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A.  Wausau’s Previous Mill Closures 
A brief review of broad industry trends is helpful. The top panel in Figure 1 
provides the total number of employees in the paper and paper products industry 
over the period 1990–2015.23 Shaded areas mark National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) recessions and the red line marks China’s membership in the 
World Trade Organization.24 There is a striking decline in the number of employ-
ees in this industry. Slightly more than 40% of jobs in the industry were lost over 
the sample period. Most of the decline took place from the late 1990s through 
2010, with a somewhat lower decline thereafter.  
It is well known that the United States has been losing manufacturing jobs 
over the same time period. In an effort to disentangle the decline in employment 
in the paper and paper products from these broader trends, we provide a simple 
decomposition of the decline into that driven by overall employment trends in the 
United States and, more specifically, in manufacturing. The second panel in Fig-
ure 1 provides the ratio of employment in manufacturing to total nonfarm U.S. 
employment, showing the large decline in manufacturing relative to total nonfarm 
employment. Employment in manufacturing comprised approximately 16% of to-
tal nonfarm employment in the early 1990s, declining to about 9% by 2015.  
                                                 
23 Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/data/\#employment (last visited May 26, 2018). 
Employment data used in Figure 1 is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Retrieval Tools. 
Paper and paper products industry is based on NAICS code 322. The employment data is not season-
ally adjusted. 
24 China became a member of the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2001. Id. 
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Figure 1: Employment Trends in the Paper and Paper Products Industry 
 
Importantly, in the third panel we provide the ratio of employment in paper 
and paper products to that of employment in manufacturing. If the decline in em-
ployment in paper and paper products mirrored that in manufacturing, we would 
expect to see a constant share throughout the twenty-five-year period. Instead, we 
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see a rate of decline in the paper and paper products industry that has been even 
greater than for manufacturing generally. Paper and paper products comprised 
about 3.7% of employment in manufacturing in the early 1990s and then showed 
a persistent decline throughout, reaching about 3% by 2015.25 Overall, Figure 1 
presents a bleak set of data, demonstrating how badly employment has turned 
down in the U.S. paper and paper products industry even relative to the decline in 
manufacturing. 
The decline in employment can be traced to several economic factors: first, 
the decline in demand due to substitution away from print paper as a means of 
communication and advertising to alternative electronic platforms. Second, 
heightened foreign competition, predominantly from China, that had negative ef-
fects on overall manufacturing employment in the United States.26 Third, in-
creased concern about the environment led to more stringent regulation resulting 
in costly investments to meet heightened standards to mitigate pollution. Con-
sistent with these declines, the number of pulp and paper mills has been falling 
for years.27 The Alliance for American Manufacturing reports on a study from the 
Center for Paper Business and Industry Studies at Georgia Tech University find-
ing that “since 2000, approximately 126 paper mills in the U.S. have ceased op-
erations and 223,000 well-paid Americans have lost their jobs.”28 The decline of 
the paper and paper products industry unquestionably has been devastating for 
jobs and communities.29 
                                                 
25 See Patrick McCarthy & Aselia Urmanbetova, Pulp and Paper Economic Indicators: A Com-
parative Analysis, CENTER FOR PAPER BUS. & INDUSTRY STUD. (September 2015) (reporting similar 
evidence on employment trends in the paper industry and in two sub-sectors: pulp, paper, and paper-
board mills and the converted products sector.). “Between 1990 and 2010, employment in the pulp, 
paper, and paperboard mills sub-sector fell by more than 50%” and “[t]he employment loss in the 
converted paper products sector was a bit more but the percentage loss was less at 30% over the entire 
period . . .” Id. 
26 David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market 
Effects of Import Competition in the United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121 (2013) (“[E]xposure to 
Chinese import competition affects local labor markets not just through manufacturing employment, 
which unsurprisingly is adversely affected, but also along numerous other margins. Import shocks 
trigger a decline in wages that is primarily observed outside of the manufacturing sector. Reductions 
in both employment and wage levels lead to a steep drop in the average earnings of households.”) Id. 
27 Maija Hujala, Heli Arminen, R. Carter Hill & Kaisu Puumalainen, Explaining the Shifts of 
International Trade in Pulp and Paper Industry, 59 FOREST SCI. 211 (2013) (“In the traditional paper 
production areas, i.e., North America and Western Europe, paper demand is stagnating or even de-
creasing, depending on the paper grade, and, as a consequence, the number of pulp and paper machines 
and mills has declined dramatically in recent years.”). Id. 
28 The decline in the number of paper mills traces further back to the 1970s. Changyou Sun, 
Lifetimes of US Paper and Allied Products Mills: Insights from a Duration Analysis, 30 J. APPLIED 
FORESTRY 5, (2006) (“Nationwide, there were 577 mills in 1970 but only 499 in 2000”) (internal 
citation omitted); Jeffrey Bonior, Picking Up The Pieces After A Paper Mill Closes, ALL. FOR AM. 
MFG. (May 14, 2015), http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/entry/picking-up-the-pieces-af-
ter-paper-mill-closes. 
29 For a study of the impact of a mill closure on a rural Canadian town, see Jacquelyn Mary 
Oncescu, Rural Restructuring: Community Stakeholders’ Perspectives of the Impact of a Pulp and 
Paper Mill Closure on Community Relationships, 24 RURAL SOC’Y 177 (2015). 
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Given the long-term decline in the paper and paper products industry, it is no 
surprise that the Wausau Paper Corp.—the owner of the Brokaw mill—was clos-
ing mills for years with no involvement from shareholder activists. In 2005, the 
company closed its sulfite pulp mill in Brokaw, Wisconsin—the same town that 
ten years later saw the closure of its paper mill and gave the Brokaw Act its name. 
The company blamed the 2005 closure on the pulp mill’s “high cost of operations 
and capital investment requirements related to the unit’s aging plant and equip-
ment,” with the shutdown affecting sixty permanent jobs.30 In 2007, the company 
closed its Groveton, New Hampshire mill at a cost of approximately 303 jobs, 
blaming declining profitability in that mill’s division on “secular decline in the 
demand for” the mill’s products “and chronically oversupplied markets in North 
America,” among other things.31 In December 2008, the company announced the 
closure of its Appleton, Wisconsin facility, with a cost of ninety jobs.32 In March 
2009, the company announced the closure of its Livermore Falls/Jay, Maine mill, 
saying that the closure (along with other decisions announced by the company) 
were “necessary to . . . match capacity with demand during a period of severe 
economic difficulty.”33 That mill closure cost ninety-six jobs.34 All these closures 
took place well before the arrival of a hedge fund activist, Starboard Value, in 
mid-2011. 
                                                 
30 Wausau Paper Announces Pulp Mill Closure, BUS. WIRE (July 6, 2005, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20050706005869/en/Wausau-Paper-Announces-Pulp-
Mill-Closure. 
31 For the announcement of the closure, see Press Release, SEC, Wausau Paper Announces 
Third-Quarter Results (Oct. 23, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105076/0000916480 
0 7000142/wpex991.htm. The village of Groveton is located within the town limits on Northumber-
land. Northumberland, NEXTDOOR, https://nextdoor.com/neighborhood/northumberland--groveton--
nh/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). This town experienced the closure of another paper mill in 2007, the 
Groveton Paper Board mill, leading to the loss of 108 workers. For a report analyzing these closures 
and “the devastating economic impact on this area from the closure of those two mills,” see Letter 
from Richard S. Brothers, NHES Commissioner (Dec. 2007), http://www.nhes.nh.gov/elmi/prod-
ucts/documents /cooscounty-groveton.pdf. As of early 2016 the town had not been successful in bring-
ing back lost jobs. See Town approves $400K bond to bring jobs to former mill site, CONCORD 
MONITOR (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.concordmonitor.com/Articles/2016/03/From-Archives1/Grov 
etonMill-cm-031516. 
32 Press Release, SEC, Wausau Paper Revises Fourth-Quarter Earnings Guidance Reflecting 
Weaker Market Conditions (Dec. 17, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105076/0000 
91648008000170/wpex99.htm. 
33 Press Release, SEC, Wausau Paper Announces Strategic Financial & Capacity Initiatives 
(Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/egar/data/105076/000091648009000079/wpex991.ht 
m. 
34 The company shut down one paper machine earlier in the year at this mill so the combined 
loss totaled 235 mill workers. See Bobbie Hanstein, Wausau Paper announces permanent shut down 
of Livermore Falls/ Jay Mill, DAILY BULLDOG (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.dailybulldog/com/db/featur 
es/ wausau-paper-announces-permanent-shut-down-of-livermore-fallsjay-mill/. 
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B.  The Brokaw Mill Closure 
Did “an out-of-state hedge fund close[] a paper mill that had provided good 
jobs to the town for over 100 years” after “[forcing] out its executives”?35 A look 
at the timeline and the public announcements proves the answer is no. Though 
engaged in some discussions with a hedge fund activist at the time of the Brokaw 
mill closure, Wausau’s existing board of directors and executives remained in full 
control of the company before and during the decision to close the Brokaw mill 
in December 2011 and had been considering closure of the Brokaw mill for 
months and possibly years. 
Evidence of the decline in the company’s paper segment can be traced to well 
before the arrival of the activist investor in mid-2011. The company stated in its 
2007 annual report that it initiated a profit recovery plan and noted its “determi-
nation to address the underperforming portions of [its] business. In [its] most chal-
lenging segment, Printing & Writing . . .”—the segment including the Brokaw 
mill. The report refers to the continued decline over the entire decade in the de-
mand for uncoated free sheet paper resulting in “paper supply [that] has exceeded 
demand despite the consolidation and capacity rationalization which has occurred 
across the industry. These factors have led to highly competitive market condi-
tions and eroding industry margins with pricing leverage insufficient to offset the 
impact of increased manufacturing costs—most notably fiber and energy.”36 “The 
same report links the decision to close the Groveton mill (303 lost jobs) to the 
company’s three-part recovery plan, which the company completed in the fourth 
quarter of 2009.”37  
The company’s effort to grow its towel and tissue segment, while stemming 
the loss in the paper division, are well summarized by the October 3, 2010 
Deutsche Bank report summarizing the company’s third quarter results: 
 
The Big Picture. Focus on tissue (good margins, good re-
turns), consider monetization of land ($1+/share) & exit pa-
per business. 2009 claim to have “fixed" paper doesn’t hold 
up. WPP continues to plow time & cash into paper despite a 
decade of woeful performance (reinvest in Rhinelander up-
grade, Buy Brainerd mill, shut Groveton & Jay mills, reinvest 
in Brokaw mill, put $27MM more into Brainerd, etc.). Value 
& options around paper are steadily shrinking. We like & re-
spect mgmt. [sic], but with executive comp equaling large % 
                                                 
35 Press Release, supra note 10. 
36 Change is Inevitable Progress, Essential, WAUSAU PAPER, (2007), http://www.annualre-
ports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/w/NYSE_WPP_2007.pdf. 
37 Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton, and Jonathan Zandberg, Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious 
Case of the Brokaw Act, SSRN (Feb. 9, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2860167. 
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of GAAP net income for several yrs [sic], are their incentives 
aligned with public shareholders.38 
 
This 2010 report is telling for three reasons. First, it reiterates the need to 
focus on the successful segment of the company—towel and tissue—which, a 
year later, the hedge fund activist will adopt as the main part of its restructuring 
efforts. Second, the report objects to the company’s claim that the recovery plan 
has fixed the trouble in the paper segment. Third, the analysts question whether 
the high executive compensation is set optimally to incentivize management. Six 
months later, on April 11, 2011, Deutsche Bank followed with an additional report 
stating: “Despite claims of having ‘fixed’ these operations 2yrs [sic] ago, the num-
bers suggest otherwise. Even so, Wausau continues to plow additional capital into 
the specialty mills.”39 The analysts continue to stress their concern with executive 
compensation stating that “it’s not clear management incentives are aligned with 
those of shareholders.”40  
We plot in Figure 2 the annual total of CEO compensation from 2000 through 
2014.41 The sample reflects the tenure of three CEOs.42 The first, from 2000–
2011, the second from 2012–2013, and the last one for 2014.43 The level of com-
pensation increases throughout the decade, peaking in 2011, the same year in 
which the company decided to shut down the Brokaw mill.44 This pattern is con-
sistent with the analyst’s concerns regarding the dysfunctional link between bad 
firm performance and high executive compensation.45  
 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. Executive compensation data is from Execucomp, a subscription-based database. We use 
their total compensation measure, TDC1, defined as the sum of salary, bonus, other annual, restricted 
stock grants, LTIP Payouts, all other, and Execucomp’s own methodology of estimating the fair value 
of option grants. For recent papers that use TDC1, see Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has 
CEO Pay Increased So Much? 123 Q.J. ECON. (February 2008), and Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, 
Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1004 (2010) (“TDC1 will more closely approximate the compensation a company’s board expected to 
pay the executive.”) Execucomp also provides the total compensation as reported by the company to 
the SEC for 2006–2014. These figures are qualitatively similar to those provides in Figure 2. For 
example, in 2006 the company reported a total compensation for the CEO of $2.2M, rising to $4.7M 
in 2009, $4.5M in 2010, and then declining to $1.5M in 2013 and $0.6M in 2014. 
42 Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton, and Jonathan Zandberg, Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious 
Case of the Brokaw Act, SSRN (Feb. 9, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 
860167. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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Figure 2: CEO Compensation at Wausau Paper 
 
In the months before the announcement of the Brokaw mill closure, Wausau 
Paper Corp. was in discussions with a well-known hedge fund activist, Starboard 
Value. We know from publicly-available materials that Wausau’s senior manage-
ment met privately with representatives of Starboard Value on June 20, 2011.46 
On July 28, 2011, Starboard Value filed a Schedule 13D47 reporting ownership of 
6.3% of the common stock of Wausau.48 In a letter dated July 28, 2011, the prin-
cipal of Starboard Value, Jeffrey C. Smith, wrote to Wausau’s then-chief execu-
tive officer that Wausau was “deeply undervalued,” partly as a result of the effect 
the “dismal performance of the Company’s paper business” was having on the 
company’s more successful tissue business.49 The paper business, Smith argued, 
was “struggling due to increased commoditization and significant competition 
                                                 
46 Starboard Delivers Letter to CEO and Board of Directors of Wausau Paper, PR NEWSWIRE 
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/starboard-delivers-letter-to-ceo-and-board 
-of-directors-of-wausau-paper-130980908.html (displaying letter from Jeffrey C. Smith, Managing 
Member, Starboard Value LP, to Thomas J. Howatt, President and CEO, Wausau Paper Corp. from 
July 28, 2011). 
47 Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires those who acquire more than 5 
percent of the stock of a public company to file a Schedule 13D within ten days. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) 
(2016). 
48 Schedule 13D Information, United States SEC (July 18, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Arc 
hives/edgar/data/105076/000092189511001506/sc13d06297097_07182011.htm. 
49 PR NEWS WIRE, supra note 46. 
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from larger and more established players.”50 By contrast, Smith wrote Wausau’s 
tissue business had a “bright future.”51 Overall, Starboard’s observations appear 
to mirror the views of outside analysts and Wausau’s own management. 
Just three days later, the local paper reported a story about the Brokaw mill. 
“According to an internal Wausau Paper Corp. memo from the vice president to 
the employees dated July 12, 2011, the Brokaw mill had failed to earn acceptable 
returns for Wausau since 2002.”52 “While the Brokaw mill has a proud manufac-
turing tradition that dates back over 100 years, we are facing an unprecedented 
perfect storm of rising input costs, declining demand and ever more aggressive 
competitors,” the company management wrote.53 The company’s spokesman, 
who verified the authenticity of the memo, referred to the Brokaw mill as “our 
most challenged facility.”54 Wausau later said that it had “been evaluating strate-
gic alternatives for the Paper segment’s print and color business[—the part of 
Wausau’s business that included the Brokaw mill—]since the first quarter of 2011 
and ha[d] engaged a financial advisor in continuing to evaluate a range of alter-
natives.”55 All this suggests that possible closure of the Brokaw mill had been on 
the table for months, if not years, before the arrival of the activist. 
The clearest indication of Starboard Value’s assessment regarding the future 
of the Brokaw mill—an assessment that advocated a sale, not closure—was made 
public in a letter sent on October 3, 2011 to the CEO and board of directors of the 
company: 
 
[W]e believe the Board must be proactive and hire a financial 
advisor to immediately explore a sale of this business to one of 
several larger and better capitalized strategic acquirers. Such 
potential acquirers would be well positioned to realize substan-
tial synergies by merging the Paper business with their own op-
erations.56 
 
By December 2011, however, the company had decided not only to shut 
down the Brokaw mill, but also to exit the print and color paper business entirely, 
attributing the decision to “dramatic and irreversible market demand decline and 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton, and Jonathan Zandberg, Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious 
Case of the Brokaw Act, SSRN (Feb. 9, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 
860167. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Form 8-K: Current Report, United States SEC (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives 
/edgar/data/ 105076/000091648011000132/wp8k.htm. 
56 PR NEWS WIRE, supra note 46. 
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the need for consolidation to bring these markets properly into balance.”57 On De-
cember 6, 2011, the Wausau board of directors approved a plan to permanently 
close the Brokaw mill.58 In doing so, the company eliminated approximately 450 
hourly and salaried jobs.59 There is no evidence that hedge fund activism played 
any determinative role in the closure of the Brokaw mill.60 
Then, where did the story come from? Years after the closure, Wausau’s chief 
executive officer claimed that Wausau had a buyer lined up for the Brokaw mill, 
but that Starboard Value’s public criticism of the paper business caused the po-
tential buyer to lower its price to an “unacceptable” level around the same time 
that the mill lost a major customer.61 He did not disclose the “unacceptable” terms, 
but it is difficult to believe that Starboard Value’s criticism of the paper industry 
could have influenced a potential mill buyer, where those criticisms reflected 
well-known and overwhelming industry trends.62 More likely, the story reflects 
after-the-fact scapegoating, a story that—while apparently false—motivates leg-
islation proposed in the United States Senate.63 
                                                 
57 Wausau Paper Enters Agreement to Sell Premium Print & Color Brands, United States SEC 
(Dec. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105076/000091648011000149/wpex99.htm 
58 Form 8-K: Current Report, United States SEC (Dec. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/105076/000091648011000149/wp8k.htm. 
59 Id. 
60 Alon Brav, J.B. Heaton, Jonathan Zandberg, Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The Curious 
Case of the Brokaw Act, SSRN (Feb. 8, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2860167. Starboard Value’s block ownership at the end of December 2011 was 8.458% 
based on their 13F filing to the SEC and obtained from S&P Capital IQ. At the same time, other long-
term, typically passive institutions, held jointly a much larger fraction of the company stock. Specifi-
cally, the top ten were, BlackRock (10.06%), Wilmington (5.984%), Dimensional Fund Advisors 
(5.624%), Wells Capital Management (5.528%), T. Rowe Price (5.222%), Vanguard (5.195%), 
DePrince, Race & Zollo (3.754), Brookfield Asset Management (2.927%), Columbia Management 
Investment Advisers (2.912%), Credit Suisse Asset Management (2.359%), for a combined 49.565% 
of shares outstanding. Capital IQ also provides shares ownership by current and previous company 
insiders. The top five at the end of December 2011 were: San W. Orr, Jr., who at the time was the non-
executive chairman of the board (4.094%), Gary Freels, a former director, (1.983%), Thomas Howatt, 
the CEO of the company since August 2000 (0.593%), Andrew Baur, a former director (0.224%), and 
Hank Newell, who at the time was executive vice president and chief operating officer and about to 
replace Howatt as CEO in January 2012 (0.084%). Id. 
61 Michael Kranish, Rise of Activist Investing Is Felt at Century-Old Firm, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 
15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/08/15/the-rise-activist-investing-felt-cen-
tury-old-company/TgtMxLrZGbuUyWSsgFtCEP/story.html. 
62 Id. Starboard Value continued its discussions with Wausau management through the fall of 
2011, but never approached control of the company. On October 3, 2011, Starboard Value filed an 
amended Schedule 13D disclosing ownership of 7.5% of the common stock of Wausau. Schedule 13D, 
SEC (Sept. 29, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105076/000092189511001889/sc13  
da106297097_09292011.htm. 
63 See Kranish, supra note 61. 
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III.  TWO QUESTIONABLE CLAIMS ABOUT HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
We now consider two claims inherent in the Brokaw Act. The first—that 
hedge fund activists typically use the ten-day disclosure period of Rule 13(d)-(1) 
to accumulate positions significantly in excess of 5%—has been the subject of 
empirical study and has been disproven.64 The second—that hedge fund activists 
often form a “wolf pack” in the pre-disclosure period to act collectively against a 
target—is also without empirical support.65  
A.  Myth: Activists “Abuse” the Schedule 13D Disclosure Window 
The Brokaw Act would have shortened the disclosure period of Section 13(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act for 5% ownership to two days.66 Currently, Sec-
tion 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 13(d)-1(a) require that any 
beneficial owner of more than 5% of a class of registered equity securities must 
file Schedule 13D within ten days after passing the 5% threshold.67 Schedule 13D 
discloses the identity of the beneficial owner, the funding source for the pur-
chases, the investment purposes, the number of shares, and other information.68 
Some commentators have argued that trading volume in advance of Schedule 13D 
disclosures is so high that it must reflect wolf pack formation. Professors Coffee 
and Palia examine a chart showing an increase in abnormal volume and conclude  
 
that the high volume of trading that is evident . . . on the last 
eight days preceding the Schedule 13D’s filing is attributable 
to others, who most likely have been informed by those filing 
the Schedule 13D of their intentions. The inference then seems 
obvious: tipping and informed trading appears to characterize 
both the formation of the ‘wolf pack’ and transactions during 
the window period preceding the filing of the Schedule 13D.69 
  
But, there are serious problems with this inference. Professors Coffee and 
Palia made their inference after examining a chart that appears to show an increase 
in abnormal volume starting at day t-8 (i.e., eight days before the Schedule 13D 
filing). That chart is reproduced below in Figure 3 below. Professors Coffee and 
Palia cite to evidence that “most of the buying by those who file a Schedule 13D 
                                                 
64 Brokaw Act, 115 S. 1744 (2017). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 17 C.F.R. § 240. 13d-1(a). 
68 Id. 
69 Coffee and Palia, supra note 2, at 565. These claims have largely been accepted at face value. 
See, e.g., William R. Tevlin, The Conscious Parallelism of Wolf Packs: Applying the Antitrust Con-
spiracy Framework to Section 13(d) Activist Group Formation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2335 (2016), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss5/17. 
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is ‘concentrated on the day they cross the threshold as well as the following 
day.’”70 They then assume, without evidence, that the day of and day after the 
threshold is crossed are days t-10 and t-9 from the filing date so that, in their 
reasoning, the observed abnormal volume apparent from days t-8 to the filing date 
of the Schedule 13D “is attributable to others” than the hedge fund activist.71 They 
then claim that those “others . . . most likely have been informed by those filing 
the Schedule 13D of their intentions.”72 They assert, “[t]hus, much of the buying 
during the ten-day window seems likely to be by other wolf pack members.”73 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Event Day Return and Turnover (Coffee and Palia) 
 
The problem is that it is factually incorrect to assume that hedge fund activists 
cross the 5% threshold on days t-10 and t-9, such that the trading in the remaining 
eight days is by others. Hedge fund activists often file Schedule 13Ds well before 
the ten-day window closes. The histogram in Figure 4, reproduced from prior 
work,74 shows that many hedge fund activists file before the ten-day window 
closes with a large number of filings in the days before day ten.  
 
                                                 
70 Coffee and Palia, supra note 2, at 565 (quoting Bebchuk, et al., supra note 1, at 6). 
71 Id. at 565. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Bebchuk, et al. supra note 1, at 4–5 fig.1. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Number of Days from Crossing to Filing Date 
 
If Professors Coffee and Palia want to determine the level of abnormal vol-
ume following the date that the activist crosses the 5% threshold, they must center 
data on the date the reporting threshold was crossed rather than the date that the 
Schedule 13D was filed. When we do so, the anomalous pattern of abnormal vol-
ume disappears; volume spikes on the day the activist crosses, with much smaller 
levels of abnormal volume before that date, as reflected in Figure 5, a reproduced 
chart from an earlier study:75 
                                                 
75 Id. at 23. Corroborating evidence is given in Nickolay Gantchev & Pab Jotikasthira, Institu-
tional Trading and Hedge Fund Activism, MGMT. SCI., (Feb. 23, 2017), https://pubsonline.informs. 
org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2654 (tracking hedge fund ownership for a sample of events over the 
period 2000–2007). The majority of the activist stake is purchased in the days leading to and including 
the date in which the activist crosses the five-percent threshold. See id. figs.1 & 2. 
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Figure 5: Turnover Centered Around the Crossing of the 5% Threshold 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show that (i) there is a large variation in the number of days 
that activists take in order to publicly file and (ii) that the exceptional trading vol-
ume, if any, occurs on the day the activist crosses the 5% threshold. If one erro-
neously assumes that activists always take ten days until filing, then an event 
study centered on the filing date (rather than the cross date) would lead one to the 
mistaken conclusion (such as that by Coffee and Palia) that abnormal trading took 
place several days after the crossing. 
Note that the data does not eliminate the possibility of some tipping or wolf 
pack formation after the crossing of the 5% threshold, but as Figure 5 illustrates, 
the number of additional shares purchased by the elusive pack is economically 
small and is nowhere near the range suggested by Coffee and Palia unless much 
of the trading on the trigger date is by investors forming a wolf pack. It is also 
likely that an important part of the trading on the threshold day is by investors 
other than the hedge fund activist. Such trading can arise either because of leaked 
information about the activist’s intent to cross the 5% threshold or because activ-
ists choose to trade precisely when they anticipate or observe uninformed selling. 
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While leakage of information is possible, we are not aware of any direct empirical 
evidence supporting such a large-scale sharing of information. This is especially 
important since similar patterns of abnormal volume—with a spike at the thresh-
old crossing date—appear for non-activist Schedule 13D filers as well where no 
plausible “wolf pack” theory exists.76 Second, trading by hedge fund activists is 
not independent of abnormal volume. Research shows that hedge fund activists 
trade more—i.e., build their positions—when liquidity (i.e., volume) is higher.77 
That is, the high turnover is what one should expect to see if Schedule 13D filers, 
whether activists or not, choose to trade.78 There simply is no basis to assume that 
trading by non-activists is trading by members of a wolf pack. 
IV.  TWO OTHER BROKAW ACT PROPOSALS AND THE MYTHS BEHIND THEM 
We now consider two additional parts of the proposed Brokaw Act. The first 
would have expanded the concept of beneficial ownership to include certain de-
rivatives linked to the value of equity securities. The second would have required 
increased disclosure of short positions in the stock of public companies. Neither 
activity plays any important role in hedge fund activism. 
A.  Expanding the Definition of Beneficial Ownership 
The Brokaw Act would have expanded the concept of beneficial ownership 
to include derivatives linked to the value of equity securities that currently do not 
have to be reported.79 Under existing rules, beneficial ownership occurs when a 
person, directly or indirectly, has the power (or the right to acquire such power) 
to vote or dispose of an equity security. The real target of the Brokaw Act is cash-
settled swaps. Cash-settled swaps that reference common stock give their “long” 
counterparty the right to receive the value of any increase in the price of the un-
derlying shares plus the value of any cash distributions, like dividends.80 Cash-
                                                 
76 See Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal & Jan Schnitzler, What is Special About Hedge Fund Activism?: 
Evidence from 13-D Filings (Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 14–16, 2014), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506704. Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Schnitzler collect a 
sample of all Schedule 13D filings between 1985–2012, splitting their sample into filings made by 
hedge funds, financial institutions, insiders and other 10% holders and other unidentified filers. Id. As 
can be seen from their Figure 9, the spike in turnover and the steep subsequent decline in turnover is 
evident in all four subsamples. Id. at fig.9. 
77 Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Vyacheslav Fos, Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trad-
ing? 70 J. FIN. 1555 (2015) (activists select times of higher liquidity when they trade); Atanas Mihov, 
Predisclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors and Price Impact of Trading, REV. FIN. 231 (2016). 
78 Nickolay Gantchev and Pab Jotikasthira, Institutional Trading and Hedge Fund Activ-
ism, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming 2016) (linking institutional selling in the period prior to the Schedule 
13D filing, which they argue to be uninformed, to activists’ supply of liquidity and block formation). 
79 S. 2720, § 2(b). 
80 See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). 
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settled swaps obligate their long counterparty to pay to the “short” counterparty 
the value of any decline in the value of the shares plus interest.81 Typically, the 
short counterparty—usually a swap dealer such as a broker-dealer—purchases ac-
tual shares of the underlying stock to hedge the risk of price increases and divi-
dend payments that it faces by maintaining a short position in the cash-settled 
swap.82 As a result, the cash-settled swap—which might otherwise be viewed as 
a purely economic instrument without control rights over securities—can result 
in the control of stock by the cash-settled swap counterparty (via its hedge) that 
may either give the long counterparty some influence over the voting of the shares 
or create the possibility of a quick acquisition of the shares in settlement of the 
derivative.83  
Beyond a single well-publicized case, however,84 there is little evidence of 
the extent to which cash-settled swaps are important in hedge fund activism. To 
the extent that they are used to evade the reporting requirements of Section 13(d), 
existing law already requires treating the underlying share interest as beneficially 
owned.85 Existing law also already requires the reporting of exchange-traded op-
tions positions that are settled physically, though recent research shows that ac-
tivists rarely use such options.86 Moreover, it is not clear that the desire that some 
investors and issuers may have for a full picture of an activist’s economic interest 
should outweigh an activist’s interest in keeping private that part of its investment 
that does not directly or indirectly influence voting control of the issuer’s securi-
ties.87 It may be true, as a leading jurist and commentator suggests, that “there is 
good reason to make sure that the other stockholders have full information about 
the precise economic interests” of an activist.88 But that case remains to be made. 
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); J.B. Heaton, CSX Corporation v. The Children's Investment Fund: Total Return Swaps as Eva-
sions of Section 13(d) Reporting, SEC. LIT. J. 16 (Summer 2009). 
85 Heaton, supra note 85, at 16–17. 
86 Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Vyacheslav Fos & Dmitry Muravyev, Informed Trading and Option 
Prices: Evidence from Activist Trading 4 (Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 15–55, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2675866 (“We find that informed investors 
rarely use derivatives. Specifically, only in 66 out of 2,905 Schedule 13D filings we analyze do in-
formed investors disclose the usage of derivatives”). Id. 
87 Id. at 7. 
88 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 473 (2014). 
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B.  Requiring Disclosure of Short Positions 
The Brokaw Act would have required disclosure within two business days of 
short interest representing more than 5% of an issuer’s equity securities, essen-
tially mirroring the requirements for long positions.89 Short sellers sell borrowed 
shares at a price they believe will be higher than the price they will be required to 
pay in the future to return the shares to the share lender.90 A “short sale” is “any 
sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated 
by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.”91 It is 
(in this context) a bet on the decline in the share price. Financial economics has 
long suggested that some short selling may be necessary to prevent prices from 
reflecting only the views of the most optimistic investors in the market.92 Research 
demonstrates that short sellers also play an important role in uncovering firms that 
misrepresent their financial statements.93 Unlike long positions, neither Section 
13(d) nor any other U.S. securities regulation requires investors to disclose short 
positions in excess of some threshold percentage.  
The sponsoring Senators asserted that “[d]erivatives are part of every activ-
ist’s toolkit. In some cases, they are used to create a ‘net short’ that allows the 
activist to profit by secretly voting against the company’s interests.”94 This was a 
strange claim in context of the Brokaw Act. Short positions play essentially no 
role in hedge fund activism of the type that otherwise appears to be the target of 
the legislation, i.e., investment positions that the activist hopes will increase in 
value as the stock of the target increases. Instead, the Brokaw Act’s proposal for 
short positions may have been aimed only at a unique situation where a hedge 
fund buys shares giving it voting power, but hedges out its economic interest with 
short positions, a phenomenon known as “empty voting.”95 In any case, the pro-
posal was never likely to do much. The staff of the Division of Economic and 
Risk Analysis of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has reported that 
short positions of 5% or more are “extremely rare.”96 
                                                 
89 Chris Gyves, Darryl R. Marsch & Jessica L. Dickerson, Beneficial Ownership Reporting and 
the Brokaw Act, WOMBLE CARLYLE (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx 
?g=7b5fee58-4030-4a7e-b2de-5bf8c84ec209. 
90 Tomi Kilgore, Short Sellers are not Evil, but They are Misunderstood, MARKET WATCH (Nov. 
13, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/short-sellers-are-not-evil-but-they-are-misunderstood 
-2017-11-08. 
91 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2016). 
92 Short Sale Position and Transaction Reporting, SEC (June 5, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/dera 
/reportspubs/special-studies/short-sale-position-and-transaction-reporting.pdf [hereinafter Staff Re-
port]. 
93 Jonathan M. Karpoff & Xiaoxia Lou, Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct, 65 J. FIN. 1879 
(2010); see also Wuyang Zhao, Activist Short-Selling (Oct. 19, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Toronto), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852041. 
94 Baldwin, supra note 16. 
95 See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: 
Taxonomy, Implications, Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006). 
96 Staff Report, supra note 92, at 93. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
When bad things happen, it is tempting to conclude that something must be 
done. But the loss of jobs in Brokaw, Wisconsin was not the work of hedge fund 
activists, and nothing that happened there warrants anti-activist legislation. The 
Brokaw Act targets hedge fund activists for conduct that is largely mythical rather 
than addressing the root cause of the loss in jobs in the paper industry that has 
been caused by changes in demand, competition, regulation, and other factors that 
have led to the decline of this once great industry. 
We must be on guard against policies as poorly supported as the Brokaw Act. 
Publicly-held corporations produce much of the world’s products and services, 
employ a good part of the world’s population, directly and indirectly, and are the 
means through which much of the world’s investable wealth is created and held. 
Hedge fund activists are merely the latest incarnation of an activity that has been 
present since the first shares of a corporation were dispersed beyond the corpora-
tion’s directors and managers: scrutiny of director and manager decision making 
by non-director, non-manager shareholders. Hedge fund activists spend consider-
able time and resources to identify companies that might become more valuable 
(that is, have higher share prices) through some change of action by managers. 
Activist investors employ highly-skilled analysts and use available information to 
form proposals for change at target companies. Importantly, activist investors put 
money where their mouths are, buying stakes that are significant enough to pay 
back the expenses of investigating targets, engaging with management and other 
shareholders, and, if necessary, engaging in expensive contests for the votes of 
other shareholders and, sometimes, even litigation. If activist investors are suc-
cessful (at least partially) in persuading the company’s directors or their fellow 
stockholders to pursue new strategies, they enjoy the financial benefits. If they are 
wrong, they may incur losses. And many have. 
Non-shareholders—especially employees, officers, and directors, and the 
politicians who represent them—have an interest in a corporation staying alive 
beyond the time horizon of the initial business opportunity that sparked the cor-
poration’s formation in the first place. To the extent that the corporation can raise 
capital and invest its cash flow in the profitable exploitation of new business op-
portunities, the share price benefits alongside those with a more tangible interest 
in the corporation’s survival. But it is not a foregone conclusion that longevity is 
good for shareholders.  
Sometimes “exit”—leaving the market and shutting down operations—is the 
strategy that maximizes shareholder value. As one court put it in a different con-
text, “[a] corporation is not a biological entity for which it can be presumed that 
any act which extends its existence is beneficial to it.”97 Unfortunately, the evi-
dence suggests that officers and directors of public corporations do a poor job of 
                                                 
97 In re Inv’rs Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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exiting in a timely and efficient fashion. Instead, many corporations continue to 
invest in businesses that cannot be expected to deliver adequate returns on new 
investment, while others use good cash flow from existing businesses to “diver-
sify” into new lines, rather than returning those funds to shareholders and letting 
shareholders invest in new businesses on their own. 
Not surprisingly, some hedge fund activism is aimed at stopping value-de-
stroying decisions of this type or reversing such decisions that were made in the 
past. This puts hedge fund activists—and the shareholders who support them—at 
odds with those constituencies we mentioned above who benefit from those deci-
sions. And there is no question that what is in the interests of shareholders is often 
painful for non-shareholders. There is an undeniable human cost to capitalism’s 
“creative destruction”—the term coined by economist Joseph Schumpeter in his 
classic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy98—including the pain of unemploy-
ment and the psychic sting of perceived failure. There are good reasons to believe 
that a vibrant capitalist system that facilitates exit and encourages reinvestment is 
the best form of economic system available in the sense that it is the best way to 
ensure the maximum amount of wealth in a society. But that is cold comfort to a 
dislocated worker, an officer or director whose business judgment is no longer 
bearing fruit, or a community ravaged by the close of its largest employer. Part of 
understanding hedge fund activism is understanding the real conflict that exists 
between shareholders and non-shareholders. But that is no excuse for misrepre-
sentations in the law-making process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
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